Research on Nuclear Responsibility(ies)

I am co-editor of Nuclear Responsibility: Defining Responsible Nuclear Statecraft in an Era of Great Power Competition(Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2025), which explores how states define and contest what it means to act “responsibly” in nuclear affairs. 

Todd C. Robinson & Alice Spilman
This chapter lays the conceptual groundwork. It unpacks the many meanings of “responsibility” in IR — cause, accountability, obligation, and identity/status — and shows how these play out in nuclear politics. It reviews the English School and constructivist traditions, contrasts prescriptive vs. practice-based approaches, and maps the contested spectrum from deterrence-as-responsible to abolition-as-responsible. The authors propose a reconceptualization: nuclear responsibility should be seen as accountability in both objective (legal) and subjective (normative) terms, always open to contestation.

Kyle Balzer
Balzer explores the concept of “hedging” in U.S. nuclear policy. Tracing its Cold War roots and codification in the 1994 NPR, the chapter shows how failing to hedge (McNamara’s 1960s restraint) left the U.S. vulnerable, while later competitive hedging restored NATO credibility and pressured the Soviets. The argument: hedging is a form of responsible stewardship, insuring against uncertainty while shaping competition. Balzer concludes that in today’s tripolar environment with China and Russia, hedging remains essential to avoid instability and reassure allies.

Tyler Bowen
Bowen analyzes the Biden administration’s frequent use of “nuclear responsibility” language, contrasting it with previous U.S. administrations. The rhetoric serves four functions: (1) signal Article VI compliance under the NPT despite stalled disarmament, (2) keep NNWS invested in the NPT over the Ban Treaty, (3) brand Russia, China, and DPRK as “irresponsible,” and (4) justify nuclear modernization. But Bowen warns this strategy risks backfiring: without a clear standard of what counts as “responsible,” the U.S. leaves itself open to charges of hypocrisy and erosion of credibility.

Robert Peters
Peters charts the surprising 2023 emergence of a bipartisan U.S. nuclear mainstream. Against Russian aggression, Chinese nuclear expansion, and U.S. modernization struggles, Congress and bipartisan commissions converged on support for modernization, SLCM-N, agile infrastructure, and even expanded theater nuclear forces. The chapter argues that the new consensus redefines “responsibility” as ensuring the U.S. can deter and, if necessary, prevail in nuclear competition. Those advocating unilateral reductions are increasingly marginalized.

E. Paige Reid
Reid examines how “integrated deterrence” — across domains, agencies, and alliances — reshapes nuclear responsibility. The U.S. now faces the “three-body problem” of deterring Russia and China simultaneously, while maintaining credibility with allies. Domain integration (cyber, space) reinforces responsibility via resilience; agency integration creates competing narratives; alliance integration makes shared responsibility more explicit but also fragile. The core dilemma: overextension may blur what responsible nuclear behavior means, risking incoherence or credibility gaps.

Linde Desmaele
This chapter scrutinizes NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. NATO frames sharing as responsible — bolstering deterrence, preventing proliferation within the alliance, and adhering to the NPT. But critics argue it violates the spirit (if not the letter) of Articles I & II, is militarily obsolete, undermines democratic accountability, and perpetuates irresponsibility by clinging to deterrence. The chapter concludes that NATO’s quest for responsible status is undercut by normative contestation, secrecy, and failure to address critics’ concerns.

Brendan S. Mulvaney
Examines how China conceives of nuclear responsibility amidst its dramatic modernization and “nuclear breakout.” China officially clings to its No First Use pledge and “minimum deterrence” rhetoric, framing itself as a cautious and responsible power. Yet its rapid expansion toward a robust triad, adoption of launch-on-warning, and deliberate vagueness on key issues suggest a more flexible — and potentially destabilizing — approach. The chapter highlights the dual narrative: Beijing presents itself as a restrained, responsible power while simultaneously building capabilities that complicate stability and blur lines between conventional and nuclear forces.

Jinwon Lee
Analyzes the DPRK’s path from NPT member to nuclear-armed state through the lens of responsibility. It traces how Pyongyang delayed safeguards, exploited NPT membership to advance its program, and withdrew under Article X while claiming self-defense. Post-acquisition, its repeated nuclear tests, missile launches, and the 2022 law endorsing potential preemptive use mark it as irresponsible under international law and UNSC resolutions. Yet domestically, nuclear weapons are framed as responsible tools for survival, regime legitimacy, and Juche ideology. The chapter underscores the clash between North Korea’s self-justifications and global critiques.

Sophia Poteet
Brings a feminist lens to nuclear responsibility. It shows how nuclear-armed states deploy masculinized protector narratives (“responsible stewards” and “just warriors”) to justify deterrence, modernization, and hierarchy, while portraying proliferators as “feminized” and irresponsible. Russia’s use of gendered rhetoric in its war on Ukraine — linking nuclear threats to the defense of “traditional values” — is a stark example. In contrast, the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW mobilize feminist critiques, reframing responsibility around human security, victim assistance, and environmental remediation. This chapter highlights how gendered narratives both reinforce and challenge global nuclear order.

Eva-Nour Repussard
Focuses on the Nuclear Responsibilities Programme (BASIC & ICCS) as a diplomatic tool to move past adversarial blame-games. Instead of labeling states as “responsible” or “irresponsible,” the program promotes dialogical engagement grounded in reflection, empathy, and shared responsibility. A detailed case study of India–Pakistan dialogues shows how this approach helps reframe security dilemmas, strengthen crisis communication, and reduce mistrust. The chapter argues that inclusive, responsibility-based dialogue can offer more sustainable stability than adversarial finger-pointing.

Megan Dee
Presents a practice theory perspective: nuclear responsibility is less a norm than a communicative practice of justification and critique. Nuclear-armed states routinely proclaim themselves “responsible” while branding adversaries “irresponsible,” reinforcing legitimacy for deterrence and order. But this practice is at a critical moment: non-nuclear states reject the language as hollow, the TPNW challenges the moral basis of deterrence, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the fragility of “responsibility talk.” Dee argues responsibility claims may be nearing the end of their lifecycle as a stabilizing practice, suggesting reflection, stakeholder engagement, and even strategic silence as alternatives to toxic blame-games.