Research on Strategic Stability and Instability

My first major research trajectory investigates the shifting meaning of strategic stability in an era of multipolarity and technological change. Traditional approaches often assume that adversaries share a common logic of proportionality and escalation; my work demonstrates that this assumption no longer holds. Instead, I argue that escalation is fundamentally interpretive: adversaries ascribe radically different meanings to the same act, producing what I term interpretive divergence. This insight underpins my book manuscript, Seeking (In)Stability in an (In)Stable World: Interpretive Strategy in a Multipolar Age (under review at Georgetown University Press). By reframing strategic stability through interpretive divergence, I seek not only to resolve contemporary nuclear puzzles but also to establish a new analytic paradigm for future research on escalation and deterrence.

Reframes “stability” not as an objective condition but as an interpretive construct. Reviews how realism, liberalism, and constructivism each define stability differently, then shows how nuclear deterrence captured and fragmented the concept of “strategic stability.” Introduces the Stimulus–Interpretation–Response (SIR) framework, arguing that what matters is not intent, but how actions are interpreted and responded to.

Argues there is no singular “international system” but rather a system of systems — overlapping subsystems with different domains, tempos, and interpretive logics. Explains vertical vs. horizontal organization, temporal asymmetry, system interference, and interpretive pluralism. IR theories are recast as interpretive filters rather than predictive models.

Builds a general theory: instability arises less from power or complexity than from interpretive misfit across systems. Moves from linear escalation models (the “ladder”) to wormhole escalation, where meaning collapses across domains. Introduces the Strategic Revisionism Trinity (objectives, capacity, willingness), stability envelopes, and feedback dynamics. Shows how escalation often emerges unintentionally from recursive misreads.

Analyzes the state as a strategic system of subsystems (bureaucracies, politics, institutions). Shows how internal misalignment or “strategic drift” can destabilize external behavior. Uses the Strategic Revisionism Trinity to map cases (e.g., North Korea, Iran, U.S. NATO posture). Demonstrates how internal feedback loops, narrative fragmentation, or authoritarian rigidity can generate instability without external provocation.

Focuses on two-actor systems. Dyadic stability depends on mutual intelligibility of signals, not just capability balance. Explains mechanisms of misalignment: misfit feedback loops, domain escalation mismatch, and narrative drift. Case studies include the U.S.–Russia “Soyuz Moment” and the India–Pakistan Balakot crisis. Emphasizes dyadic literacy: the capacity to read the other’s escalation logic in their own terms.

Examines how the presence of a third actor changes dynamics. Signals are triangulated and reframed, creating new instability pathways. Covers ally, spoiler, and mediator roles, with case studies such as NATO–Ukraine–Russia and Turkey–Russia–NATO in Syria. Highlights the importance of triadic literacy to anticipate reframings.

Analyzes multi-actor systems (n > 3). Complexity creates risks of signal dilution, procedural lag, and echo structures (reinforcing interpretive clusters). Case studies include ASEAN, BRICS, and NATO. Explains how coalitions can stabilize or destabilize depending on design and buffering mechanisms. Develops the concept of n-adic literacy: mapping interpretive landscapes, anticipating echo divergence, and designing buffered signaling.

Looks at regional and functional orders (e.g., Middle East, East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa). Shows how sub-global architectures act as “orders within orders.” Introduces the idea of reverberation across subsystems and narrative contagion. Compares different sub-global systems:

• The NPT (institutional inertia),
   
• The great power order (vertical dominance),
   
• The Belt and Road Initiative (material insurgency),
   
• The TPNW (normative insurgency).
  Each is assessed for its stabilizing or destabilizing impact.
   

Takes the planetary view: the global envelope is humanity’s collective survival capacity. Explores existential threats like climate change, nuclear war, pandemics, technological catastrophe, and cascading systemic failures. Uses historical analogues (Black Death, Tambora eruption, WWII, Spanish Flu) to illustrate “near misses.” Argues that the global envelope has no external buffers, so prevention and cross-domain readiness are paramount.

Synthesizes the argument: stability is systemic, relational, and interpretive. Complexity is not inherently destabilizing; instability arises from misfit and weak interfaces. Calls for strategic literacy at every level — the ability to read signals, manage misfit, and design buffers. Outlines implications for theory, policy, and future research. Ends by framing stability as an active process of design and maintenance, not a default state.